dc.contributor.author
González-Maestre, Miguel
dc.contributor.author
Martínez-Sánchez, Francisco
dc.identifier
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/203768
dc.identifier
urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:203768
dc.description.abstract
Altres ajuts: fSENECA/11885/PHCS/09
dc.description.abstract
We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly market where competing media platforms choose also their level of advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of quality, advertising and welfare under private and mixed duopoly competition. We show that the welfare comparison between the private and mixed duopoly regimes depends, crucially, on the interplay between the net direct effect of advertising on welfare and the degree of substitutability between platforms. We also consider the effects on quality and welfare of recent policies tending to eliminate advertising as a way of financing publicly-owned platforms.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Valencia ; Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas,
dc.relation
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación ECO2009-07616/ECON
dc.relation
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación ECO2010-19830
dc.rights
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dc.rights
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject
Endogenous quality
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Two-sided markets
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Broadcasting duopoly
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Publicly-owned platform
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Advertising regulation
dc.title
Quality choice and advertising regulation in broadcasting markets