dc.contributor.author |
Burguet, Roberto |
dc.contributor.author |
Caminal, Ramon |
dc.contributor.author |
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica |
dc.contributor.author |
Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica |
dc.date |
2012 |
dc.identifier |
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/102026 |
dc.identifier |
urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:102026 |
dc.format |
application/pdf |
dc.language |
eng |
dc.publisher |
|
dc.relation |
Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers ; |
dc.rights |
open access |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: |
dc.rights |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ |
dc.subject |
Consolidació d'empreses Models economètrics |
dc.title |
Bargaining failures and merger policy |
dc.type |
Working paper |
dc.description.abstract |
In this paper we study the optimal ex-ante merger policy in a model where merger proposals are the result of strategic bargaining among alternative candidates. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of the participating firms. The model demonstrates that, under some circumstances, relatively inefficient mergers may take place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating higher social surplus and even higher profits. Such bargaining failures have important implications for the ex-ante optimal merger policy. We show that a more stringent policy than the ex-post optimal reduces the scope of these bargaining failures and raises expected social surplus. We use a bargaining model that is flexible, in the sense that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers. |