dc.contributor.author |
Burguet, Roberto |
dc.contributor.author |
Ganuza Fernández, Juan José |
dc.contributor.author |
Hauk, Esther |
dc.contributor.author |
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica |
dc.contributor.author |
Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica |
dc.date |
2009 |
dc.identifier |
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/45359 |
dc.identifier |
urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:45359 |
dc.format |
application/pdf |
dc.language |
eng |
dc.publisher |
|
dc.relation |
Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers ; |
dc.rights |
open access |
dc.rights |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat, la unitat i l'institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús |
dc.rights |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ |
dc.subject |
Fallida |
dc.subject |
Responsabilitat limitada |
dc.title |
Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement |
dc.type |
Working paper |
dc.description.abstract |
In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor. |