Organisational structure, communication and group ethics

dc.contributor.author
Ellman, Matthew
dc.contributor.author
Pezanis-Christou, Paul
dc.contributor.author
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
dc.contributor.author
Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
dc.date.issued
2007
dc.identifier
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/45270
dc.identifier
urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:45270
dc.description.abstract
This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language
eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation
Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers ;
dc.rights
open access
dc.rights
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.
dc.rights
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
dc.subject
Economia Investigació
dc.title
Organisational structure, communication and group ethics
dc.type
Working paper


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