Voting by committees with exit

All of RECERCAT

Title:	Voting by committees with exit
Author:	Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
Abstract:	We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
Subject(s):	-Elecció social Models matemàtics
Rights:	open access Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat, la unitat i l'institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
Document type:	Working paper
Published by:
Share:
Uri:	https://ddd.uab.cat/record/45187