dc.contributor.author
Massó, Jordi
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Neme, Alejandro
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Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
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Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
dc.identifier
https://ddd.uab.cat/record/45163
dc.identifier
urn:oai:ddd.uab.cat:45163
dc.description.abstract
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.
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application/pdf
dc.relation
Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers ;
dc.rights
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dc.rights
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
dc.title
A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem
