dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor.author
Calleja, Pere
dc.contributor.author
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
dc.date.accessioned
2018-03-22T17:25:57Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:35:20Z
dc.date.available
2018-03-22T17:25:57Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:35:20Z
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/306979
dc.description.abstract
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) has been axiomatically characterized
from different points of view. Van den Brink (2001) proposes a characterization
by means of efficiency, fairness and the null player property. In this
paper, we characterize the family of single-valued solutions obtained by relaxing
fairness into weak fairness. To point out the Shapley value, we impose
the additional axiom of weak self consistency and strengthen the null player
property into the dummy player property.
eng
dc.format.extent
15 p.
cat
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2018-10
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
cat
dc.title
Weak fairness and the Shapley value
cat
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
cat
dc.rights.accessLevel
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
