dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Peris, Josep E. |
dc.contributor.author |
Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel) |
dc.contributor.author |
Subiza, Begoña |
dc.date.accessioned |
2017-07-20T06:56:22Z |
dc.date.available |
2017-07-20T06:56:22Z |
dc.date.created |
2016-11-03 |
dc.date.issued |
2016 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/290742 |
dc.format.extent |
23 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2016-29 |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Jocs cooperatius |
dc.title |
A `solidarity' approach to the problem of sharing a network cost |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
A minimum cost spanning tree problem analyzes the way to efficiently
connect individuals to a source when they are located at different places.
Several rules have been defined to solve this problem. Our objective here is
to propose a new approach that differentiates some costs that may deserve
compensations (involuntary costs) from some other connection costs that
may be considered voluntary. We therefore define a solidarity egalitarian
solution, through which, the total cost is allocated by considering pay-backs
to equalize the involuntary costs, thus fulfilling the weak stability condition
of individual rationality.
Keywords: Minimum cost spanning tree, Solidarity, Cost sharing,
Egalitarian
JEL classification: C71, D63, D71. |