dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Calleja, Pere
dc.contributor.author
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
dc.date.accessioned
2016-08-30T10:34:36Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:27:58Z
dc.date.available
2016-08-30T10:34:36Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:27:58Z
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/266577
dc.description.abstract
On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate
how the main results in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) vary when we
replace self consistency by projected consistency or max consistency. As a
consequence, we obtain several axiomatic comparison among the (weighted)
Shapley value, the (weighted) surplus division solution and the prenucleolus.
eng
dc.format.extent
29 p.
cat
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2016-18
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs cooperatius
cat
dc.title
Consistency distinguishes the (weighted) Shapley value, the (weighted) surplus division value and the prenucleolus
cat
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
cat
