dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Bannikova, Marina
dc.contributor.author
Jelnov, Artyom
dc.date.accessioned
2016-08-30T09:59:37Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:28:03Z
dc.date.available
2016-08-30T09:59:37Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:28:03Z
dc.date.created
2016-05-02
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/266572
dc.description.abstract
This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which
have to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist who is interested
in a certain outcome of the vote. We show that the ease of manipulating a legislature
decision by the lobbyist is increasing with the number of parties. A high threshold
leads to fewer parties represented, and consequently, decreases the ease of changing
a legislature decision by the lobbyist. On the other hand, a high threshold may
cause a misrepresentation of voters. We show that if the threshold is higher that
6%, the impact of the misrepresentation effect becomes significant.
eng
dc.format.extent
8 p.
cat
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2016-13
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Ciències polítiques -- Presa de decisions
cat
dc.subject.other
Partits polítics
cat
dc.subject.other
Grups de pressió
cat
dc.title
The number of parties and decision making in legislatures
cat
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
cat
