dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Brito, Duarte |
dc.contributor.author |
Osório, António (António Miguel) |
dc.contributor.author |
Ribeiro, Ricardo |
dc.contributor.author |
Vasconcelos, Helder |
dc.date.accessioned |
2016-04-14T17:56:16Z |
dc.date.available |
2016-04-14T17:56:16Z |
dc.date.created |
2015-10 |
dc.date.issued |
2015 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/260963 |
dc.format.extent |
50 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-33 |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Oligopolis |
dc.subject.other |
Monopolis |
dc.title |
Unilateral Effects Screens for Partial Horizontal Acquisitions: The Generalized HHI and GUPPI |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive
effects of partial acquisitions. We propose a generalization to a partial horizontal acquisition setting of
the two most traditional indicators used to screen unilateral anti-competitive effects: the Helfindahl-
Hirschman Index and the Gross Upward Price Pressure Index. The proposed generalized indicators can
deal with all types of acquisitions that may lessen competition in the industry: acquisitions by owners
that are internal to the industry (rival firms) and engage in cross-ownership, as well as acquisitions by
owners that are external to the industry and engage in common-ownership. Furthermore, these indicators
can deal with direct and indirect acquisitions, which may or may not correspond to control, and nest full
mergers as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving
industry. The results seem to suggest that (i) a full merger induces higher unilateral anti-competitive
effects than a partial controlling acquisition involving the same firms, (ii) a partial controlling acquisition
induces higher unilateral anti-competitive effects than a partial non-controlling acquisition involving the
same firms and the same financial stakes, and (iii) an acquisition by owners that are internal to the
industry induces higher unilateral anti-competitive effects than an acquisition (involving the same firms
and the same stakes) by external owners that participate in more than one competitor firm.
JEL Classification: L13, L41, L66
Keywords: Antitrust, Partial Horizontal Acquisitions, Oligopoly, Screening Indicators, HHI,
GUPPI |