dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Germano, Fabrizio |
dc.contributor.author |
Zuazo-Garin, Peio |
dc.date.accessioned |
2016-04-14T15:56:10Z |
dc.date.available |
2016-04-14T15:56:10Z |
dc.date.created |
2015-11-02 |
dc.date.issued |
2015 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/260959 |
dc.format.extent |
32 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-29 |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica) |
dc.subject.other |
Teoria de la informació (Economia) |
dc.title |
Bounded Rationality and Correlated Equilibria |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place
any restrictions on how players' behavior deviates from rationality. Instead we assume that there exists
a probability p such that all players play rationally with at least probability p, and all players believe,
with at least probability p, that their opponents play rationally. This, together with the assumption of
a common prior, leads to what we call the set of p-rational outcomes, which we define and characterize
for arbitrary probability p. We then show that this set varies continuously in p and converges to the
set of correlated equilibria as p approaches 1, thus establishing robustness of the correlated equilibrium
concept to relaxing rationality and common knowledge of rationality. The p-rational outcomes are easy
to compute, also for games of incomplete information, and they can be applied to observed frequencies of
play to derive a measure p that bounds from below the probability with which any given player chooses
actions consistent with payoff maximization and common knowledge of payoff maximization.
Keywords: strategic interaction, correlated equilibrium, robustness to bounded rationality, approximate knowledge, incomplete information, measure of rationality, experiments. JEL Classification: C72,
D82, D83. |