Title:
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Gathering support from rivals: the two agent case with random order
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Author:
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Bannikova, Marina; Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel)
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Other authors:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
Abstract:
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Which alternative is selected when voters are called to participate in a
sequential voting? Does the ordering matter? The current approach is the
first attempt to analyze these questions. Specifically, we propose a two-
alternative sequential voting procedure in which two voters are randomly
ordered. Each voter has complete information about the preference of both
of them. The alternative is implemented if there is unanimity. We obtain
that the most patient individual has some advantage in the election, but it is
not enough to guarantee that his most-preferred alternative will be selected.
The probability to vote first also plays a central role, since the election also
depends on the voting order.
Keywords: Sequential Voting; Random order; Sub-game perfect
equilibrium |
Publication date:
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2015 |
Subject (UDC):
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32 - Política |
Subject(s):
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Elecció (Psicologia) Eleccions |
Rights:
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L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
Pages:
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13 p. |
Document type:
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Working Paper |
Published by:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
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Collection:
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Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-27
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