dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Osório, António (António Miguel)
dc.date.accessioned
2015-04-22T15:53:22Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:28:51Z
dc.date.available
2015-04-22T15:53:22Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:28:51Z
dc.date.created
2015-03-23
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/249233
dc.description.abstract
In the present paper we characterize the optimal use of Poisson signals to establish
incentives in the "bad" and "good" news models of Abreu et al. [1]. In the former,
for small time intervals the signals' quality is high and we observe a "selective" use of
information; otherwise there is a "mass" use. In the latter, for small time intervals the
signals' quality is low and we observe a "fine" use of information; otherwise there is a
"non-selective" use.
JEL: C73, D82, D86.
KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Infor-
mation Characteristics.
eng
dc.format.extent
13 p.
cat
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-14
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Teoria de jocs
cat
dc.subject.other
Informació, Teoria de la
cat
dc.subject.other
Contractes -- Aspectes econòmics
cat
dc.title
Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals
cat
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
cat
