On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games

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Utilizad este identificador para citar o enlazar este documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/247807

Título:	On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games
Autor/a:	Calleja, Pere; Llerena Garrés, Francesc
Otros autores:	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
Abstract:	On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.
Fecha de creación:	2015
Materias (CDU):	33 - Economia
Materia(s):	Jocs cooperatius
Derechos:	L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Páginas:	24 p.
Tipo de documento:	Documento de trabajo
Editor:	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Collection:	Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-12
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