On the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core

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RECERCAT Home > Universitat Rovira i Virgili > Departament d'Economia > Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia > View document

Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/220221

dc.contributor	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author	Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel
dc.contributor.author	Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia
dc.date.accessioned	2013-11-19T09:49:39Z
dc.date.available	2013-11-19T09:49:39Z
dc.date.created	2013-06-28
dc.date.issued	2013
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2072/220221
dc.format.extent	10 p.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-23
dc.rights	L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source	RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other	Jocs cooperatius
dc.subject.other	Economia del benestar
dc.subject.other	Elecció social
dc.title	On the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.subject.udc	33 - Economia
dc.embargo.terms	cap
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we prove that the Mas-Colell bargaining set coincides with the core for three-player balanced and superadditive cooperative games. This is no longer true without the superadditivity condition or for games with more than three-players. Furthermore, under the same assumptions, the coincidence between the Mas-Collel and the individual rational bargaining set (Vohra (1991)) is revealed. Keywords: Cooperative game, Mas-Colell bargaining set, balancedness, individual rational bargaining set. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

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