dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel
dc.contributor.author
Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia
dc.date.accessioned
2013-11-19T09:49:39Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:31:50Z
dc.date.available
2013-11-19T09:49:39Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:31:50Z
dc.date.created
2013-06-28
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/220221
dc.description.abstract
In this paper we prove that the Mas-Colell bargaining set coincides with the
core for three-player balanced and superadditive cooperative games. This
is no longer true without the superadditivity condition or for games with
more than three-players. Furthermore, under the same assumptions, the
coincidence between the Mas-Collel and the individual rational bargaining
set (Vohra (1991)) is revealed.
Keywords: Cooperative game, Mas-Colell bargaining set, balancedness,
individual rational bargaining set. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.
eng
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-23
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs cooperatius
dc.subject.other
Economia del benestar
dc.subject.other
Elecció social
dc.title
On the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
