dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel
dc.date.accessioned
2013-05-31T13:58:07Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:33:35Z
dc.date.available
2013-05-31T13:58:07Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:33:35Z
dc.date.created
2013-01-16
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/211806
dc.description.abstract
In this paper we relax the Colonel Blotto game assumption that for
a given battle the player who allocates the higher measure of resources
wins that battle. We assume that for a given battle, the Colonel who
allocates the higher measure of resources is more likely to win that battle.
We have a simpler model for which we are able to compute all Nash
equilibria in pure strategies for any valuations pro le that players might
have. Something that is not possible for the original Blotto game.
JEL: C72, D74, H56.
KEYWORDS: Colonel Blotto game; lottery contest function.
eng
dc.publisher
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-05
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.subject.other
Gestió de conflictes
dc.subject.other
Seguretat nacional
dc.title
The Lottery Blotto Game
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
