dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Theilen, Bernd, 1965-
dc.date.accessioned
2011-09-19T15:28:56Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:30:10Z
dc.date.available
2011-09-19T15:28:56Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:30:10Z
dc.identifier.issn
1988 - 0812
dc.identifier.other
T - 1323 - 2011
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/169684
dc.description.abstract
This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model
in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft
information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed
at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent.
The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in
this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure
for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22.
Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard.
cat
dc.format.extent
345599 bytes
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2011-15
dc.rights
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/)
cat
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Subcontractació
ca
dc.title
Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting
ca
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
ca
