dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author
Alcalde, José
dc.contributor.author
Dahm, Matthias
dc.date.accessioned
2011-09-19T14:44:19Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:32:51Z
dc.date.available
2011-09-19T14:44:19Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:32:51Z
dc.identifier.issn
1988 - 0812
dc.identifier.other
T - 1211 - 2011
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/169682
dc.description.abstract
We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the
total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among
the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par-
ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly
positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma-
tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii)
Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex-
penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.
Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action.
JEL: C72, D44, H57
cat
dc.format.extent
669518 bytes
dc.format.mimetype
application/pdf
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2011-13
dc.rights
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/)
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.title
Competition for Procurement Shares
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
