Competition for Procurement Shares

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RECERCAT Home > Universitat Rovira i Virgili > Departament d'Economia > Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia > View document

Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/169682

dc.contributor	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
dc.contributor.author	Alcalde, José
dc.contributor.author	Dahm, Matthias
dc.date.accessioned	2011-09-19T14:44:19Z
dc.date.available	2011-09-19T14:44:19Z
dc.date.created	2011
dc.date.issued	2011
dc.identifier.issn	1988 - 0812
dc.identifier.other	T - 1211 - 2011
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2072/169682
dc.format.extent	40
dc.format.extent	669518 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2011-13
dc.rights	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/)
dc.subject.other	Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.title	Competition for Procurement Shares
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.subject.udc	33 - Economia
dc.description.abstract	We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par- ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma- tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex- penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format. Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action. JEL: C72, D44, H57

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