dc.contributor
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor.author
Corchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.author
Dahm, Matthias
dc.date.accessioned
2011-05-09T16:02:15Z
dc.date.accessioned
2024-12-10T13:30:14Z
dc.date.available
2011-05-09T16:02:15Z
dc.date.available
2024-12-10T13:30:14Z
dc.identifier.issn
1988 - 0812
dc.identifier.other
T - 1462 - 2010
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/148481
dc.description.abstract
We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants'
efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function
is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such
a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending
on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are
closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into
account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the
recent literature on political economy.
Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies.
JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political
Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)
cat
dc.format.extent
419147 bytes
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application/pdf
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2010-05
dc.rights
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/)
dc.source
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
dc.subject.other
Teoria de jocs
dc.subject.other
Ciències polítiques -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject.other
Presa de decisions
dc.title
Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
