dc.contributor.author
Pineda Oliva, David
dc.date.issued
2025-03-28
dc.identifier
http://hdl.handle.net/10256/26680
dc.description.abstract
In this paper, I discuss the goal-directed theory of emotion as advanced and defended by psychologist Agnes Moors. I give some reasons for supporting one of its main tenets, namely, that emotional episodes involve decision-making processes. I will however object that the theory has trouble to account for some aspects of positive emotions and in general to accommodate some instances of extremely positive and extremely negative emotions. I will also argue that, in order to account for the irrationality involved in emotional recalcitrance, some sort of duality of emotional mechanisms is also required
dc.description.abstract
Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. Project code: PID2021-127046NA-100
dc.description.abstract
Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.relation
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s12136-025-00637-3
dc.relation
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0353-5150
dc.relation
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/eissn/1874-6349
dc.rights
Reconeixement 4.0 Internacional
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source
Acta Analytica, 2025, vol. undef, núm. undef, p. undef
dc.source
Articles publicats (D-FS)
dc.source
Pineda Oliva, David 2025 Some Reflections on the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotion Acta Analytica undef undef undef
dc.subject
Emocions -- Presa de decisions
dc.subject
Emotions -- Decision making
dc.title
Some Reflections on the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotion
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
