Universitat de Girona
This paper is devoted to analyse both the epistemology and ontology of James’s pragmatism and his metaphysical proposals. The conclusions are: first, that James did not defend a metaphysical realism, but a antirealist realism; and secondly that this position was what he needed to defend the possibility of human freedom and religious experience
Article
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Catalan
Realitat; Reality; Creença i dubte; Belief and doubt; Pragmatisme; Pragmatism; James, William, 1842-1910; Religió -- Filosofia; Religion -- Philosophy
Societat de Filosofia del País Valencià
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/2341-1414
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/eissn/0213-5965
Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Spain
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/es/
