Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge
Article
Published version
English
Intencionalitat (Filosofia); Intentionality (Philosophy); Coneixement d'un mateix, Teoria del; Self-knowledge, Theory of; Raonament; Reasoning
Universidad del País Vasco
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1387/theoria.479
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0495-4548
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/eissn/2171-679X
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/