Publication date

2007



Abstract

Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge

Document Type

Article


Published version

Language

English

Publisher

Universidad del País Vasco

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Rights

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/

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