dc.contributor.author
Ramírez-Ludeña, Lorena
dc.date.accessioned
2026-01-22T01:58:13Z
dc.date.available
2026-01-22T01:58:13Z
dc.date.issued
2026-01-20T14:13:59Z
dc.date.issued
2026-01-20T14:13:59Z
dc.date.issued
2026-01-20T14:13:59Z
dc.identifier
Ramírez-Ludeña L. Legal disagreements: a pluralist reply to Dworkin's challenge. Revus. 2016;(28):11-32. DOI: 10.4000/revus.3345
dc.identifier
https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72292
dc.identifier
https://dx.doi.org/10.4000/revus.3345
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/72292
dc.description.abstract
In this paper I analyse the problem of legal disagreements, initially raised by Ronald Dworkin against Hartian positivism. According to Dworkin, disagreements are pervasive, since law is an argumentative practice in which participants invoke normative arguments. Positivists, who claim that law depends upon agreement among officials, have difficulties to make sense of the fact that lawyers frequently disagree. I first present the main arguments in the debate. I then go on to distinguish different levels at which lawyers disagree. Taking these levels into consideration, I articulate a pluralist reply that shows that the fundamental positivist tenets remain untouched by Dworkin's challenge.
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.publisher
Klub Revus - Centre for Studies on Democracy and European Constitutionality
dc.relation
Revus. 2016;(28):11-32.
dc.rights
The text only may be used under licence CC BY-SA 4.0. All other elements (illustrations, imported files) may be subject to specific use terms.
dc.rights
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
dc.rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject
Legal disagreements
dc.subject
Legal positivism
dc.subject
Direct reference theories
dc.title
Legal disagreements: a pluralist reply to Dworkin's challenge
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
