Preference cohesion and bargaining satisfaction among Southern EU member states: a comparative perspective

Abstract

To what extent does being aligned in EU negotiations predict favourable outcomes for the Southern Euro countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) in Council of the EU negotiations? This article attempts to answer this question by leveraging data from the DEU (Decision-Making in the European Union) dataset, and comparing this group of countries to two other well-established alliances at the EU level: the Nordics and the Visegrad Four. Results indicate that the Southern alliance generally lacks cohesion compared to the other groups, but when it is able to find a coherent position, it becomes more effective in obtaining its members' desired legislative outcomes. Preliminary evidence also suggests that this effect occurs because aligning gives groups of countries more voting power, and because their social capital makes them more effective in negotiations.

This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry Science and Research under Grant PID2020-119716GB-I00; it was also supported by the Erasmus + programme of the European Union under Grants 101085465 - BACES and 101047889 - EU-GOV (Jean Monnet Chair in European Governance).