Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
2020-05-25T09:27:05Z
2020-05-25T09:27:05Z
2018-04-10
2020-05-25T09:25:36Z
By allowing networks to split, decentralized blockchain platforms protect members against hold up, but hinder coordination, given that adaptation decisions are ultimately decentralized. The current solutions to improve coordination, based on premining cryptocoins, taxing members and incentivizing developers, are insufficient. For blockchain to fulfill its promise and outcompete centralized firms, it needs to develop new forms of soft decentralized governance (anarchic, aristocratic, democratic, and autocratic) that allow networks to avoid bad equilibria.
Working document
English
Blockchain; platforms; networks; hold‐up; coordination; relational capital; incomplete contracts; decentralized governance; Business Economics and Industrial Organization
Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1608
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
