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Bargaining, coalitions and competition
Dagan, Nir; Serrano, Roberto; Volij, Oscar
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy,in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitionsof finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with theWalrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalenceresults between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the caseof indivisible goods.
finite coalitions
strategic bargaining
walrasian equilibrium
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