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Title:
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The Shapley value analyzed under the Felsenthal and Machover bargaining model
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Author:
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Bernardi, Giulia; Freixas Bosch, Josep
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Other authors:
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Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs |
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Abstract:
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This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Public choice. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0560-2. |
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Abstract:
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In 1996, Felsenthal and Machover proposed a bargaining procedure for a valuable payoff in cooperative and simple games. They proved that the value underlying their bargaining scheme was the Shapley value by showing that it verifies the axioms that Shapley proposed for characterizing his value. They remarked that a direct proof of the result involves rather formidable combinatorial difficulties, but that it has some independent interest. In this paper, we prove such a combinatorial result and obtain a formula for the Shapley value that has a great potential to be extended to more general classes of games. |
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Abstract:
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Peer Reviewed |
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Subject(s):
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-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
-Game theory
-Cooperative games (Mathematics)
-Cooperative games
-Simple games
-Shapley value
-Bargaining procedures
-Roll-calls
-Jocs, Teoria de
-Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
-Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory |
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Rights:
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Document type:
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Article - Submitted version
Article |
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