The social cost of congestion games by imposing variable delays

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Title:	The social cost of congestion games by imposing variable delays
Author:	Díaz Cort, Josep; Giotis, Ioannis; Kirousis, Lefteris; Mourtos, Ioannis; Serna Iglesias, María José
Other authors:	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Ciències de la Computació; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. ALBCOM - Algorismia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formals
Abstract:	© . This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Abstract:	In this study, we describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism incurs no additional cost, in contrast to tolls that typically differ from the social cost as expressed in terms of delays.
Abstract:	Peer Reviewed
Subject(s):	-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica -Congestion games -Price of anarchy -Coordination mechanisms
Rights:	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Document type:	Article - Submitted version Article
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