Título:
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The incentive core in co-investment problems
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Autor/a:
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Izquierdo Aznar, Josep Maria; Rafels, Carles
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Otros autores:
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Universitat de Barcelona |
Abstract:
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We study resource-monotonicity properties of core allocations in coinvestment problems: those where a set of agents pool their endowments of a certain resource or input in order to obtain a joint surplus or output that must be allocated among the agents. We analyze whether agents have incentives to raise their initial contribution (resource-monotonicity). We focus not only on looking for potential incentives to agents who raise their contributions, but also in not harming the payoffs to the rest of agents (strong monotonicity property). A necessary and suficient condition to fulfill this property is stated and proved. We also provide a subclass of coinvestment problems for which any core allocation satisfies the aforementioned strong resource-monotonicity property. Moreover, we introduce the subset of core allocations satisfying this condition, namely the incentive core. |
Materia(s):
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-Teoria de jocs -Assignació de recursos -Models matemàtics -Estudis de viabilitat -Game theory -Ressource allocation -Mathematical models -Feasibility studies |
Derechos:
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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Izquierdo Aznar et al., 2017
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ |
Tipo de documento:
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Documento de trabajo |
Editor:
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Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
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