https://hdl.handle.net/2072/453060 Fri, 03 Apr 2026 17:36:24 GMT 2026-04-03T17:36:24Z https://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026 Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions Pla Planas, Albert; López Ibáñez, Beatriz; Murillo Espinar, Javier Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simulations to study the behaviour of bidders; This research project has been partially funded through the projects labeled TIN2008- 04547 and DPI2011-24929, and BR10/18 Scholarship of the University of Girona granted to Albert Pla Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z https://hdl.handle.net/10256/7781 Comparison of Work Scheduling Using Constraint Programming or Auctions Torrent-Fontbona, Ferran; López Ibáñez, Beatriz Business processes designers take into account the resources that the processes would need, but, due to the variable cost of certain parameters (like energy) or other circumstances, this scheduling must be done when business process enactment. In this report we formalize the energy aware resource cost, including time and usage dependent rates. We also present a constraint programming approach and an auction-based approach to solve the mentioned problem including a comparison of them and a comparison of the proposed algorithms for solving them Fri, 01 Mar 2013 00:00:00 GMT https://hdl.handle.net/10256/7781 2013-03-01T00:00:00Z