2026-04-17T04:09:16Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/2236812025-12-05T01:47:36Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478820col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Toribio Mateas, Josefa author 2025-10-15T15:02:37Z 2025-10-15T15:02:37Z 2024 2025-10-15T15:02:37Z This paper examines the plausibility of an attention-based version of moral perceptualism (amp). According to amp, our perception of moral properties is characterized by perceptual attentional patterns that reflect a sensitivity to morally salient features. First, I argue that the explanation for the empirical evidence offered to support amp primarily hinges on cognitive processes rather than perceptual ones. Second, while I acknowledge the critical importance of attention in recognizing moral properties, I contend that we must expand amp’s explanatory scope to address the question of what drives this attention. I propose an account of our (in)sensitivity to wrongness that builds on amp’s core statement. In this account, the notion of salience structure of information, defined by the varying accessibility of both perceptual and cognitive representations, plays a central explanatory role. Atenció Percepció (Filosofia) Ètica Attention Perception (Philosophy) Ethics Seeing Wrongness