2026-04-14T02:56:17Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/2234352025-12-05T01:40:15Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478820col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Campdelacreu i Arqués, Marta author Oms Sardans, Sergi, 1974- author 2025-09-29T17:39:26Z 2025-09-29T17:39:26Z 2023-08-07 2025-09-29T17:39:27Z Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the statue and the lump of clay are two different colocated objects that have different forms, even though they share the same matter. Recently, there has been some discussion on the requirements of consistency for hylomorphist theories. In this paper, we focus on an argument presented by Maegan Fairchild, according to which a minimal version of hylomorphism is inconsistent. We argue that the argument is unsound or, at best, it just points to a well-known problem for hylmorphist theories. Additionally, we explore some general consequences of this fact. Hilemorfisme Objecte (Filosofia) Hylomorphism Object (Philosophy) Qua-Objects, (Non-)Derivative Properties and the Consistency of Hylomorphism