2026-04-13T00:59:12Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/2217632025-12-05T05:56:51Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Izquierdo Aznar, Josep Maria author Montes, Jesús author Rafels, Carles author 2025-06-26T08:28:43Z 2025-06-26T08:28:43Z 2024-09-01 2025-06-26T08:28:43Z Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990) introduces population monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS) and proves that every assignment game with at least two sellers and two buyers, where each buyer-seller pair derives a positive gain from trade, lacks a PMAS. In particular glove games lacks PMAS. We propose a new cooperative TU-game concept, population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes (PLMAS), which relaxes some population monotonicity conditions by requiring that the payoff vector of any coalition is Lorenz dominated by the corresponding restricted payoff vector of larger coalitions. We show that every TU-game having a PLMAS is totally balanced, but the converse is not true in general. We obtain a class of games having a PLMAS, but no PMAS in general. Furthermore, we prove the existence of PLMAS for every glove game and for every assignment game with at most five players. Additionally, we also introduce two new notions, PLMAS-extendability and PLMAS-exactness, and discuss their relationships with the convexity of the game. Assignació de recursos Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Resource allocation Cooperative games (Mathematics) Population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes for TU-games