2026-04-13T16:55:50Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/2192932025-12-06T01:59:13Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478820col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Soria-Ruiz, Andrés author 2025-02-26T18:42:44Z 2025-02-26T18:42:44Z 2025-02-21 2025-02-26T18:42:45Z A prominent class of arguments for external world skepticism rely on the plausible view that knowledge is closed under logical entailment. From the fact that one does not know that one is not a handless brain in a vat it can be inferred that one does not know that one has hands, in virtue of the fact that having hands logically entails that one is not a handless brain in a vat. The complements of knowing-how ascriptions, however, are not—obviously, at least—related by logical entailment to any proposition, and therefore, they resist that skeptical argument. Even if I don’t know that I am not a brain in a vat, it does not follow that I don’t know how to, say, play a drum rudiment. Thus, knowing-how can withstand closure-based skepticism about the external world. Consciència lingüística Escepticisme Semàntica (Filosofia) Filosofia analítica Language awareness Skepticism Semantics (Philosophy) Analysis (Philosophy) I know how to withstand the skeptic