2026-04-14T03:39:26Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/2187342025-12-05T05:56:00Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

Two families of values for global games Alonso-Meijide, José Mª Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria, 1962- Jiménez-Losada, Andrés Teoria de jocs Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Economia matemàtica Game theory Cooperative games (Mathematics) Mathematical economics A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of point valued solutions that contain the Gilboa-Lehrer value. We characterize each family by means of reasonable properties, which are related to the ones used by Gilboa and Lehrer. 2025-02-13T11:11:13Z 2025-02-13T11:11:13Z 2025-02-01 2025-02-13T11:11:13Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion 0938-2259 https://hdl.handle.net/2445/218734 747844 eng Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01567-8 Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 79, p. 181-199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01567-8 (c) Springer Verlag, 2025 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess 19 p. application/pdf Springer Verlag Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)