2026-04-18T00:32:21Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/2164752025-12-06T01:59:44Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478820col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Keeling, Sophie author 2024-11-14T11:51:20Z 2024-11-06T19:01:55Z 2024-01-01 2024-11-14T11:51:20Z [eng] This paper concerns a specifc epistemic feature of believing for a reason (e.g., believing that it will rain on the basis of the grey clouds outside). It has commonly been assumed that our access to such facts about ourselves is akin in all relevant respects to our access to why other people hold their beliefs. Further, discussion of self-intimation—that we are necessarily in a position to know when we are in certain conditions—has centred largely around mental states. In contrast to both assumptions, this paper argues that believing for a reason is (at least) very nearly self-intimating: necessarily, if a subject believes that q for the reason that p, then, provided relevant conceptual and rational capacities, she is in a position to form a justifed true belief that she believes that q for the reason that p. We should think this on the basis of the role that believing for a reason plays from the subjects’ perspective, and in particular, the way in which it intellegises one’s belief. Creença i dubte Justificació (Teoria del coneixement) Raó Belief and doubt Justification (Theory of Knowledge) Reason Believing for a Reason is (at Least) Nearly Self-Intimating