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oai:recercat.cat:2445/2133012025-12-05T05:56:22Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

urn:hdl:2445/213301 Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split Calleja, Pere Llerena Garrés, Francesc Sudhölter, Peter Fallida Anàlisi vectorial Solidaritat Bancs Bankruptcy Vector analysis Solidarity Banks In this note, we investigate the relationship between non-manipulability via merging (splitting) and strong non-manipulability via merging (splitting). Our analysis reveals that while these two non-manipulability axioms are generally not equivalent, they do coincide when the principle of solidarity is satisfied. This principle is fulfilled by a wide range of bankruptcy rules, including parametric rules. 2024-06-17T06:58:48Z 2023-09-01 2024-06-17T06:58:53Z info:eu-repo/date/embargoEnd/2026-08-31 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.004 Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023, vol. 125, p. 61-64 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.004 cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2023 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess Elsevier B.V. Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)