2026-04-17T05:51:46Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/2131022025-12-05T05:56:15Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919
RECERCAT
author
Gersbach, Hans
author
Jackson, Matthew
author
Muller, Philippe
author
Tejada, Oriol
2024-06-13T17:31:07Z2024-06-13T17:31:07Z2023-12-012024-06-13T17:31:12Z
We analyze two-party electoral competition with a one-dimensional policy space, costly policy changes, and random negative shocks to a party's viability over an infinite horizon. We show the existence and uniqueness of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in which parties use so-called simple strategies. Regardless of the initial policy, party choices converge in the long run to a stochastic alternation between two policies, with transitions occurring if and only if parties suffer a negative shock to their viability. Although costs of change have a moderating effect on policies, full convergence to the median voter position does not take place when parties are polarized.
cc-by-nc (c) Gersbach et al., 2023 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Partits polítics
Bipartidisme
Eleccions
Political parties
Two-party systems
Elections
Electoral Competition with Costly Policy Changes: A Dynamic Perspective
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion