2026-04-18T04:43:38Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/2131022025-12-05T05:56:15Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Gersbach, Hans author Jackson, Matthew author Muller, Philippe author Tejada, Oriol author 2024-06-13T17:31:07Z 2024-06-13T17:31:07Z 2023-12-01 2024-06-13T17:31:12Z We analyze two-party electoral competition with a one-dimensional policy space, costly policy changes, and random negative shocks to a party's viability over an infinite horizon. We show the existence and uniqueness of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in which parties use so-called simple strategies. Regardless of the initial policy, party choices converge in the long run to a stochastic alternation between two policies, with transitions occurring if and only if parties suffer a negative shock to their viability. Although costs of change have a moderating effect on policies, full convergence to the median voter position does not take place when parties are polarized. Partits polítics Bipartidisme Eleccions Political parties Two-party systems Elections Electoral Competition with Costly Policy Changes: A Dynamic Perspective