2026-04-17T16:53:11Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/2131022025-12-05T05:56:15Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

urn:hdl:2445/213102 Electoral Competition with Costly Policy Changes: A Dynamic Perspective Gersbach, Hans Jackson, Matthew Muller, Philippe Tejada, Oriol Partits polítics Bipartidisme Eleccions Political parties Two-party systems Elections We analyze two-party electoral competition with a one-dimensional policy space, costly policy changes, and random negative shocks to a party's viability over an infinite horizon. We show the existence and uniqueness of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in which parties use so-called simple strategies. Regardless of the initial policy, party choices converge in the long run to a stochastic alternation between two policies, with transitions occurring if and only if parties suffer a negative shock to their viability. Although costs of change have a moderating effect on policies, full convergence to the median voter position does not take place when parties are polarized. 2024-06-13T17:31:07Z 2024-06-13T17:31:07Z 2023-12-01 2024-06-13T17:31:12Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105716 Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, vol. 214 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105716 cc-by-nc (c) Gersbach et al., 2023 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Elsevier Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)