2026-04-17T07:00:49Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/2074942025-12-06T01:59:17Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478820col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Martínez, Manolo author Nanay, Bence author 2024-02-12T14:31:37Z 2025-02-01T06:10:12Z 2024-02-01 2024-02-12T14:31:37Z Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of this paper is to make explicit an ambiguity in usual formulations of intentionalism, and to argue in favor of one way to disambiguate it. It concerns whether perceptual phenomenology depends on the content of one and only one representation (often construed as being identical to a certain perceptual experience), or instead depends on a collection of many different representations, throughout the perceptual system. We argue in favor of the latter option. Intentionalism so conceived can make better sense of contemporary neuroscience of perception, and is better equipped to confront several influential objections to traditional intentionalism. Percepció Intencionalitat (Filosofia) Filosofia de la ment Perception Intentionality (Philosophy) Philosophy of mind Many-to-One Intentionalism