2026-04-17T15:47:00Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/2070692025-12-05T05:56:48Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919
RECERCAT
author
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel
author
Ehlers, Lars
2024-02-02T12:23:23Z2024-02-02T12:23:23Z2024-03-012024-02-02T12:23:23Z
In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed.
cc-by (c) Elsevier B.V., 2024 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Estadística matemàtica
Geometria algebraica
Teoria d'operadors
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Mathematical statistics
Algebraic geometry
Operator theory
Externalities and the (Pre)nucleolus in Cooperative Games
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion