2026-04-13T05:41:22Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/2070692025-12-05T05:56:48Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel author Ehlers, Lars author 2024-02-02T12:23:23Z 2024-02-02T12:23:23Z 2024-03-01 2024-02-02T12:23:23Z In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed. Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Estadística matemàtica Geometria algebraica Teoria d'operadors Cooperative games (Mathematics) Mathematical statistics Algebraic geometry Operator theory Externalities and the (Pre)nucleolus in Cooperative Games