2026-04-17T14:18:10Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/2070692025-12-05T05:56:48Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478917col_2072_478919

urn:hdl:2445/207069 Externalities and the (Pre)nucleolus in Cooperative Games Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel Ehlers, Lars Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Estadística matemàtica Geometria algebraica Teoria d'operadors Cooperative games (Mathematics) Mathematical statistics Algebraic geometry Operator theory In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed. 2024-02-02T12:23:23Z 2024-02-02T12:23:23Z 2024-03-01 2024-02-02T12:23:23Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003 Mathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 128, num.March, p. 10-15 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.01.003 cc-by (c) Elsevier B.V., 2024 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Elsevier B.V. Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)