2026-04-17T06:03:16Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1995812025-12-06T01:55:05Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917

urn:hdl:2445/199581 Income-Based Affirmative Action in College Admissions Acció afirmativa basada en la renda en l'admissió a la universitat Brotherhood, Luiz Herskovic, Bernard Ramos, João Relacions intergeneracionals Proves d'accés a la universitat Planificació educativa Intergenerational relations Entrance examinations for universities Educational planning We study whether college admissions should implement quotas for lower-income applicants. We develop an overlapping-generation model and calibrate it to data from Brazil, where such a policy is widely implemented. In our model, parents choose how much to invest in their child's education, thereby increasing both human capital and likelihood of college admission. We find that, in the long run, the optimal income-based affirmative action increases welfare and aggregate output. It improves the pool of admitted students, but distorts pre-college educational investments. The welfare-maximising policy benefits lower- to middle-income applicants with income-based quotas, while higher-income applicants face fiercer competition in college admissions. The optimal policy reduces intergenerational persistence of earnings by 5.7% and makes nearly 80% of households better off. 2023-06-21T08:51:01Z 2025-07-01T05:10:07Z 2023-07-01 2023-06-21T08:51:01Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead016 The Economic Journal, 2023, vol. 133, num. 653, p. 1810-1845 https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead016 (c) Royal Economic Society, 2023 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Oxford University Press Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)