2026-04-17T03:51:15Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:2445/1943532025-11-20T10:15:14Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917
RECERCAT
author
De Chiara, Alessandro
author
Manna, Ester
2023-02-28T18:42:17Z2023-02-28T18:42:17Z2022-07-012023-02-28T18:42:17Z
We study whether the joint adoption of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability leads to a higher level of welfare in a setting in which firms invest resources to develop an innovative product that can have negative social repercussions. We allow for firm-regulator corruption and compare two alternative regulatory regimes: lenient authorization and strict authorization. Corruption favors strict authorization and strengthens the case for making firms immune from ex-post liability so as to encourage ex-ante investment. By contrast, when lenient authorization is adopted, firms should not be insulated from liability. Hence, liability should be more severe when corruption is less common.
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2022 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Corrupció
Immunitat
Seguretat jurídica
Corruption
Immunity
Legal certainty
Corruption and the case for safe-harbor regulation
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion