2026-04-13T02:56:15Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1943532025-11-20T10:15:14Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc De Chiara, Alessandro author Manna, Ester author 2023-02-28T18:42:17Z 2023-02-28T18:42:17Z 2022-07-01 2023-02-28T18:42:17Z We study whether the joint adoption of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability leads to a higher level of welfare in a setting in which firms invest resources to develop an innovative product that can have negative social repercussions. We allow for firm-regulator corruption and compare two alternative regulatory regimes: lenient authorization and strict authorization. Corruption favors strict authorization and strengthens the case for making firms immune from ex-post liability so as to encourage ex-ante investment. By contrast, when lenient authorization is adopted, firms should not be insulated from liability. Hence, liability should be more severe when corruption is less common. Corrupció Immunitat Seguretat jurídica Corruption Immunity Legal certainty Corruption and the case for safe-harbor regulation