2026-04-13T04:15:10Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:2445/1943532025-11-20T10:15:14Zcom_2072_1057col_2072_478809col_2072_478917

urn:hdl:2445/194353 Corruption and the case for safe-harbor regulation De Chiara, Alessandro Manna, Ester Corrupció Immunitat Seguretat jurídica Corruption Immunity Legal certainty We study whether the joint adoption of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability leads to a higher level of welfare in a setting in which firms invest resources to develop an innovative product that can have negative social repercussions. We allow for firm-regulator corruption and compare two alternative regulatory regimes: lenient authorization and strict authorization. Corruption favors strict authorization and strengthens the case for making firms immune from ex-post liability so as to encourage ex-ante investment. By contrast, when lenient authorization is adopted, firms should not be insulated from liability. Hence, liability should be more severe when corruption is less common. 2023-02-28T18:42:17Z 2023-02-28T18:42:17Z 2022-07-01 2023-02-28T18:42:17Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110546 Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 216, num. 110546 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110546 cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2022 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Elsevier B.V. Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)